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November 9, 1989 was marked by the fall of the Berlin wall: the most famous 
divided city of 1920th century Europe was finally on its way to reunification.1 
Four years later, on the same day, the Old Bridge of Mostar was destroyed. For 
the old inhabitants this event marked the death of their pluralist city; for specta-
tors around the world, horrified that war once again raged in the heart of the 
European continent, Mostar staked a claim of its own to the title of Europe’s 
most renowned divided city. It contended for this dubious distinction with Nic-
osia and Belfast, though no European city could compete with Jerusalem in this 
regard. 
The story of divided Berlin has very little in common with the stories of 
Mostar, Belfast, Nicosia and Jerusalem. The German city was divided in the 
aftermath of a world war and during the Cold War confrontation. Berlin was not 
divided as a result of civil war or internal strife for hegemony or domination 
within the city or in its wider area. Nor were outside powers present to contain a 
local conflict or to divide and quit, the way Britain did as it left its former colo-
nial possessions. There had been no ethnonational rivalry over Berlin. Instead, 
these are all elements of the division of the other mentioned cities and their 
deep-rooted political and cultural contentions. While it is quite easy to see Ber-
lin as a German city, it is not as easy to classify the other cities nationally. Bel-
fast is a northern Irish town belonging to the United Kingdom and is contested 
locally by Irish Nationalists and British Loyalists. Jerusalem is both an Israeli 
and a Palestinian city and at the centre of open and exclusive claims by rival 
national ideologies and movements. Nicosia is both Greek and Turkish, divided 
by a police-controlled state border, and is the capital of both Cypriot states, 
though Greek Cypriots claim the whole city and do not recognize the Turkish 
                             
1
  This article is based on a research carried out partly independently, partly with the help of 
Eric Gobetti and for the production of the ethnographic film Around Mostar, the Bridge and 
Bruce Lee (authors: Vanni D’Alessio and Sanja Puljar D’Alessio), which has not yet been 
formally released but was presented at the conference “Revisiting Southeastern Europe. Com-
parative Social History of the 19th and 20th Centuries” (Institut für soziale Bewegungen, Ruhr-
Universität Bochum, 2007), in the documentary section of the 2008 ASN World Convention 
(Columbia University, New York City) and at several other conferences and scientific institu-
tions in Italy, Germany and Croatia. 
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Northern Cypriot Republic (along with all of the international community, ex-
cept Turkey). 
Exclusive nationalist claims on these cities refer to unresolved questions of 
sovereignty in the respective countries. Mostar is a Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
town, but Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status as a state and the means by which it will 
resist internal separatist drives are questions of some concern. Trends towards 
both integration and disintegration are present in Mostar as they are throughout 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, politics and public opinion. There is a direct 
relation between Bosnia-Herzegovina’s uncertain status as a state and Mostar’s 
lasting crisis as a divided city. Nonetheless, the elements of Mostar’s division 
are built on the city’s historical experience.  
During the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Mostar was claimed 
by all the belligerents. When the Dayton agreement was signed in November 
1995, the Bosnian Serbs managed to retain a quasi-state, the Republika Srpska, 
one of the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 They did not regain Mostar, 
however. The initial coalition of Croatian and Bosniak (Muslim) forces, which 
fought together against the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army, had forced the 
Bosnian Serbs to leave the city in 1992. After the break-up of that initial coali-
tion in 1993, the Croatian Territorial Defense (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO) 
fought for the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, with Mostar as its main city, 
but in vain. In 1994 the Bosnian Croats agreed to join a Bosniak-Croat Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ever since the war ended, however, the main 
Croatian parties have been pushing for a revision of the Dayton agreement and 
the recognition of a third, separate entity in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state.3 
During the war, Croatian forces ethnically “cleansed” the western part of the 
town. They pushed the majority of the Bosniak population to the older, eastern 
part of Mostar, though some elderly Muslims managed to remain in their apart-
ments. The old town of Mostar, situated along the river Neretva and particularly 
to its east, was already inhabited by a majority of people with Muslim identity 
or origins. This group’s preponderance in the east was further reinforced by the 
constant flow of refugees from the surrounding areas. In the western area of the 
town, only individuals who identified themselves or were identified by others as 
Croats were allowed to take shelter and settle.4 After being divided by the war’s 
                             
2  The other entity being the Croatian/Bosniak (Muslim) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
3  On Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement see Florian BIEBER, Post-War 
Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance, London 2005; Xavier BOUGAREL 
/ Elissa HELMS / Ger DUIJZINGS (eds.), The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and 
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1996. For further literature on Bosnia-Herzegovina see the following notes in this article. 
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front line, the city was further segregated in the immediate postwar period. The 
international powers, with their extensive authority in post-Dayton Bosnia, cre-
ated a system of consociational local rule that reinforced the division of Mostar 
and strengthened the leaders of the war parties.5 When the Office of the High 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina formally unified the town in 2004, it 
maintained two separate voting units, each of which had three districts and a 
clear ethnonational majority.  
Mostar is still divided in most, if not all, aspects of social and cultural life, 
and the main Croatian and Bosniak parties still carry on irreconcilable ethnic 
policies. Croats, who now comprise the relative majority of the city’s popula-
tion, have held the mayorship since the city was reunified in 2004. They are 
eager to eliminate the power sharing mechanisms governing local elections, 
which allow Bosniak nationalist parties to exert their hegemony over local elec-
toral districts where Muslims are in the majority. At the same time as they are 
fighting for a further division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities, Croa-
tian nationalists are therefore deploying a strategy and a discourse of unification 
within Mostar. Bosniak nationalists, on the other hand, use a discourse of fur-
ther unification and centralization of the country as a whole. At the same time, 
they exert their absolute majority in Sarajevo and in the Croatian-Bosniak Fed-
eration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, they refuse to accept the majority rule 
voting system and the unification of Mostar’s electoral districts, thus opposing 
the end of the consociational modus of power sharing in this town. 
Differently from postwar Berlin, postwar Mostar belongs to a category of di-
vided and contested cities in which sovereignty problems are combined with 
issues of ethnicity and nationalism. The sovereignty issue refers to the weakness 
and insecurity of the states to which these towns belong, which are undermined 
by nationalist claims raised by conflicting local political factions. Such cities are 
contested, Anthony Hepburn explains, because in their urban centres “two or 
more ethnically conscious groups – divided by religion, language and/or culture 
and perceived history – co-exist in a situation where neither group is willing to 
concede supremacy to the other”.6 Ethnicity is a crucial aspect of this situation, 
                             
 
Mostar, about 17,000 displaced persons resided there after the war, coming mainly from 
Central Bosnia, Sarajevo, Jablanica, and Konjic.” Scott A. BOLLENS, Cities, Nationalism, and 
Democratization, London / New York 2007, 171. 
5
  On consociational democracy see Arend LIJPHART, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Com-
parative Exploration, New Haven / London 1977; Id., The Power-Sharing Approach, in: Jo-
seph V. MONTVILLE (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, New York 
1991. On consociational democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina see the already mentioned books 
of Bieber and Bose and the recent article, based on research on Mostar, by Azra HROMADZIĆ, 
“Once We Had a House”. Invisible Citizens and Consociational Democracy in Post-War Mo-
star, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in: Social Analysis 56 (2012), no. 3, 30-48. 
6
  Anthony C. HEPBURN, Contested Cities in the Modern West, Basingstoke 2004, 2. 
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because it is entrenched with territorial bonds and nationalist claims. This is not 
to say that in present day Berlin the ethnic question is not relevant for the mech-
anisms producing and enhancing divisions in its urban sphere. In fact, Berlin is 
experiencing the problems of a late or post-modern divided city, particularly the 
association of urban residential divisions with ethnic belonging. This associa-
tion, however, does not stem from a German interethnic division, say, between 
east and west German Berliners, manifesting a new ethnonational differentiation 
within the city and consequently new issues of control and sovereignty. 
Other European late modern metropolises, like London and Paris, are also 
considered divided.7 Nevertheless, their divisions are either of social nature or 
linked with the relatively new global waves of immigration, which do not imply 
significant problems of nationalism and statehood. In the last few years, several 
works have appeared on divided modern metropolises and on how the forces of 
globalization and economic restructuring have affected the public sphere, pro-
ducing socio-spatial partitions in the urban fabric that divide the rich and the 
poor, the private and the public, the old settlers and the newcomers, and also 
different immigrant ethnic communities.8 These works mainly address issues of 
inequality and pluralism in the new multicultural globalized cities of the west, 
although the dramatic effects of privatization are producing new inequalities 
also in central and eastern Europe, and enhancing the marginalization of some 
segments of society.9 Though ethnicity plays an important role in debates on the 
fragmentation of urban spaces, it is depicted more as an element of concealed 
social identities.10 Nationalist forms of contestation of state power and of inter-
ethnic contention, deployed in the city’s public spaces in the name of a specific 
nationality, are not generally featured in these discussions. Following a different 
set of literature on divided cities, I focus on cities divided and contended by 
rival nationalist communities. Rather than addressing the problems of globaliza-
tion and their impact on the residential ethnic segmentation of late modern me-
                             
7  Susan S. FAINSTEIN / Ian GORDON / Michael HARLOE, Divided Cities: New York and London 
in the Contemporary World, Oxford 2002; Yuri KAZEPOV (ed.), Cities of Europe: Changing 
Context, Local Arrangements, and the Challenge to Urban Cohesion, Oxford 2005. 
8
  Peter MARCUSE / Ronald VAN KAMPEN (eds.), Of States and Cities: The Partitioning of Urban 
Space, Oxford 2002; Id. (eds.), Globalizing Cities. A New Spatial Order?, Oxford 2000; 
Richard SCHOLAR (ed.), Divided Cities: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2003, Oxford 2006. 
9
  Zorica NEDOVIĆ BUDIĆ / Sasha TSENKOVA (eds.), The Urban Mosaic of Post-Socialist Europe, 
Heidelberg 2006; Ian F. E. HAMILTON / Kaliopa DIMITROVSKA ANDREWS / Nataša PICHLER-
MILANOVIĆ (eds.), Transformation of Cities in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards Globali-
zation, Tokyo 2005; Gregory D. ANDRUSZ / Michael HARLOE / Iván SZELÉNYI (eds.), Cities 
after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies, Oxford 
1996; György ENYEDI, Social Change and Urban Restructuring in Central Europe, Budapest 
2009. 
10  Zygmund BAUMAN, Community. Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, London 2000. 
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tropolises, I study cities where ethnic differentiation is linked to nationalist 
claims that endanger the sovereignty of the state.11  
In the divided cities I discuss in this article, therefore, the rivalry between dif-
ferent ethnic groups is of a nationalist nature. It occurs within a nationalist ideo-
logical framework and deploys discourses and practices used in disputes about 
hegemony in the political and public space. These claims are also related to 
issues of state legitimation and the contestation of statehood. Aspects of inter-
ethnic contention are no less relevant here than statehood problems, since the 
mechanisms of ethnonational contrast and polarization are not necessarily in-
terwoven with contestations and claims involving the fundaments and stability 
of the state. A divided society may be the result of local political contentions 
that both express and are expressed by cultural fault lines, even when there are 
no discourses questioning the sovereignty of the state. Apart from situations of 
coincidence or proximity to state borders, a contended city showing patterns of 
division does not necessarily raise questions of state sovereignty. Yet the type, 
peculiarity and equilibrium of the state are fundamental elements of divided 
cities, as these characteristics provide the framework in which local political 
contention can develop.  
The Swiss Fribourg/Freiburg and the Italian Bolzano/Bozen show elements 
of division, but presently not of statehood contestation. In the Swiss town, eth-
nic issues do not seem to play a significant role in political competition, but 
they do play a role in the spatial organization of socialization. Nowadays in 
Bolzano, where ethnic conflict had jeopardized Italian sovereignty until the 
1960s, the town’s belonging to the Italian state is no longer controversial. Nev-
ertheless, this stabilization has not lessened the impact of ethnicity in local po-
litical competition and socialization. In both cases a settlement and a stable 
equilibrium have been reached at the state level. Conversely, in Brussels, Mon-
treal and Belfast, the polarization of public opinion along the line of the politici-
zation of ethnicities produces discourses that undermine the stability of the 
state, the very existence of which is often problematized in its institutional pre-
sent. The same could be said for Mostar after the Dayton peace process, and for 
Nicosia before it became a double city. In Nicosia under the late British Empire 
                             
11
  For a comparison between divided and contested cities see the above mentioned books by 
HEPBURN (Contested Cities in the Modern West) and BOLLENS (Cities, Nationalism, and De-
mocratization), as well as James ANDERSON, From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts: A 
Framework for Studying “Divided Cities” in “Contested States”, Part I, Belfast 2008 (Divided 
Cities/Contested States Working Paper Series, 1); Jon CALAME / Ester CHARLESWORTH, Di-
vided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia, Philadelphia 2009; Hilary 
SILVER, Divided Cities in the Middle East, in: City & Community 9 (2010), no. 4, 345-357; 
William NEILL, Urban Planning and Cultural Identity, London 2003; Dominique BRYAN, Bel-
fast: Urban Space, “Policing”, and Sectarian Polarization, in: Jane SCHNEIDER / Ida SUSSER 
(eds.), Wounded Cities: Destruction and Reconstruction in a Globalized World, Oxford 2003, 
251-270. 
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and from independence in 1960 until the 1974 Turkish invasion, interethnic 
Greek-Turkish tensions and violence were interwoven with Greek-Cypriot de-
mands for incorporation into Greece (enosis) and Turkish-Cypriot demands for 
partition of the island (taksis).12 This does not mean that these cities had not 
previously exhibited some characteristics of divided societies or that they had 
been free of ethnic divisions and contentions. Yet, the relatively low degree of 
politicization of ethnicities in Mostar both during the Yugoslav socialist period 
and under Ottoman rule, as in Ottoman Nicosia, inhibited the production of na-
tionalist discourses and claims on the common mixed territory in which the dif-
ferent groups were living. As a result, such discourses could not endanger the 
stability of the state. In part, this was a result of the different constraints that 
were imposed by the Yugoslav and Ottoman regimes. It also resulted, however, 
from dissimilar sorts of public ethnic bonds, perceptions and behaviour. 
Cities can be considered laboratories for the study of intersections between 
the economic, social, demographic and cultural aspects of modernization. One 
of the most prominent elements of European modernization has been the crea-
tion of national peoples, or nationalization. Clearly, cities serve as sites for the 
exploration of such phenomena on a smaller scale. Yet, they are also places 
where we can observe the ambiguities and consequences of nationalization in 
spaces that are, by definition, heterogeneous. The presence of a variety of ethnic 
groups in the same urban space raises sociopolitical and historical questions of 
cooperation, integration, exclusion, and of the balance of power. The problems 
related to this issue are deep-seated and have often emerged along with the po-
liticization and socialization of ethnic identities in plural communities. As has 
already been pointed out, the state framework proves crucial in this regard. His-
torically, many European towns have found themselves at the centre of 
ethnonational contentions and disputes. When typical urban heterogeneity was 
first challenged by hegemonic nationalist discourses and practices, state authori-
ties responded by allowing, legitimizing, reinforcing, containing or repressing 
such discourses and practices. During the processes of industrialization and ur-
banization, when the juxtaposition of different ethnicities derived from short 
and long distance immigration and the expansion of urban areas into the rural 
ones, national states pursued a policy of cultural and national assimilation and 
homogenization. Conversely, in multinational states and empires, a certain de-
gree of multiethnicity and pluralism was better maintained. This was the case in 
many of the mixed towns of east central Europe during the 19th and 20th centu-
ries, which were of course not “gently simmering melting pots”,13 since they 
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  Andrew BOROWIEC, Cyprus. A Troubled Island, Westport 2000; Yiannis PAPADAKIS, Echoes 
from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide, New York 2005; Id., Divided Cyprus: Mod-
ernity, History, and an Island in Conflict, Bloomington 2006. 
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  This expression is used by Janusz Bugajski when he observes how Bosnia was “far from 
being an interethnic utopia or even a gently simmering melting pot“, which in reality is a 
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were not immune to social strains and because political cleavages in many of 
them developed along nationalist lines. 
The crisis and eventual collapse of the continental European empires, cou-
pled with the spread of nationalization processes, reduced the number of eth-
nically mixed cities. Until World War Two, most central and eastern European 
towns could be defined as ethnonationally mixed, although they featured vari-
ous patterns of division and contention. These towns were still inhabited by 
groups that had been anchored to specific urban areas for generations, but were 
also involved in – although sometimes excluded from – processes of democrati-
zation usually characterized by nationally oriented political parties and national-
ist agendas. This was the case of the Habsburg Empire in its constitutional 
phase for instance, when the process of democratization as well as of the politi-
cization and nationalization of ethnic identities fuelled local political conflicts 
alongside the polarization of social and cultural interactions. The Habsburg state 
worked to reach some compromises – quite successfully in Moravia, for exam-
ple – but also permitted the development of nationalist confrontations at the 
local level. These endangered state loyalty and set the scene for ethnonational 
conflicts. Certainly, all multinational states, be they empires or federations, seek 
to ameliorate ethnic and/or national differences in order to inhibit these from 
jeopardizing state stability. James Anderson noticed how ethnonationally con-
tested and divided cities appeared on the fringes of empires that had “often cre-
ated and hierarchized politicised ethnicities which then became hard for them to 
manage as their grip weakened with the spread of competing nationalisms”.14 
The nationalization process and the integration of urban and rural masses did 
not evolve peacefully in western Europe, either. Though religious and linguistic 
amalgamation had a long history in this part of the continent, the development 
of more homogenous national states brought great discontent in the countryside 
and within industrializing urban areas, which radicalized political confronta-
tions and social relations. As a matter of fact, social problems fuelled conflicts 
both in national states and in multiethnic and multinational empires. Class 
struggle was a peculiar trait of the industrialized regions which, though less 
affected, were not exempt from ethnic and nationalist strains. Meanwhile, in 
less-industrialized or non-industrialized areas, the latent or open conflict be-
tween socially dominant and non-dominant groups was expressed also in ethnic 
and national terms along with harsh urban/rural oppositions.  
                             
 
condition hard to find in any given society, no matter the time or the type. The quote was 
taken from James SADKOVICH, Reconsidering Bosnia-Herzegovina, in: Spaces of Identity 5 
(2005), no. 1, 25-53, 29, available at <http://www.yorku.ca/soi/_Vol_5_1/_PDF/ 
Sadkovich.pdf>. All internet sources were accessed on 30 April, 2013. 
14  ANDERSON, From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts, 4 and 16. 
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The decline and collapse of multiethnic and multinational continental em-
pires early in the 20th century, and the later collapse of multinational states such 
as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have been destabilizing events. The col-
lapse of the Ottoman State in the Balkan Peninsula began in the 19th century, 
resulting in a rapid and radical decrease in the area’s Muslim population.15 
Around World War One, however, a strong increase in the use of violence oc-
curred all over Europe and also in everyday political life, followed by a renewed 
radicalization during and after World War Two. The collapse of the European 
continental empires fostered harsh conflicts amongst their successor states over 
cities and territories. These strains were generally not eased by the Versailles 
settlement, and were actually enhanced by open irredentist claims, which 
reached new heights during World War Two. Finally, after 1945, border agree-
ments and the new postwar order brought the multiethnic peculiarity of east 
central Europe to an end. Disputed border cities like Teschen / Cieszyn / Těšín, 
Danzig / Gdansk, Pilsen/Plzeň, Klausenburg / Kolozsvár / Cluj, Trieste / Trst, 
Rijeka/Fiume and many others suffered through the world wars, postwar crises 
and violent transitions. The “massive simplification of ethnic demography and 
creation of relatively homogenous populations where previously great heteroge-
neity had been the norm” took place in most of the towns of east central Europe, 
resulting in a radical unmixing of peoples.16 
In spite of various moments and periods of warfare and massive violence, 
such a radical unmixing of peoples was not accomplished in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the wars, the postwar periods or the revolutions of the 19th 
and the first half of the 20th century. The religiously mixed cities of Banja Luka, 
Sarajevo and Mostar enjoyed a relatively peaceful period of political and eco-
nomic modernization during the Austro-Hungarian condominium, and the end 
of Ottoman rule did not provoke the mass departure of the local Muslim com-
munity as it did in the coeval new Balkan national states. Robin Okey states that 
the overall Muslim emigration from Bosnia under the Austrian occupation “no 
doubt exceeded the official figure of 61,114 and contributed to a further fall in 
the Muslim proportion of the population to just under a third in the 1910 cen-
                             
15  Cf. Justin MCCARTHY, Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-
1922, Princeton/N.J. 1995. 
16
  Rogers BRUBAKER / Margit FEISCHMIDT / Jon FOX / Liana GRANCEA, Nationalist Politics and 
Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton 2006, 52. On the process of unmixing 
of peoples see Rogers BRUBAKER, Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: His-
torical and Comparative Perspectives, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 18 (1995), no. 2, 189-
218; and Id., Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Eu-
rope, Cambridge 1996. On this process see also Philipp THER / Ana SILJAK, Redrawing Na-
tions: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, Lanham 2001; and the two classics Eugene 
M. KULISCHER, Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes, 1917-1947, New York 
1948; and Joseph B. SCHECHTMANN, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, New York 
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sus”.17 The Muslim elite, however, continued to be the dominant political and 
social group.18 Muslims remained by far the strongest landowners, both among 
those possessing kmets19 (91%) and among those without kmets (70%). They 
were also the largest group employed in industry and crafts (45%) and com-
prised the majority of the population in the towns,20 even though the Habsburg 
authorities did set the conditions for the increased immigration of Christians, 
who were favored in the administrative and public sectors.21 The number of 
central European Catholics and Croats grew most quickly, but the number of 
Serbs also grew. To a lesser extent, the numbers of Muslims and Jews grew as 
well.22 The number of Muslims decreased in Banja Luka (by 3.4%), but grew in 
Sarajevo (by 18.4%). Sarajevo experienced enormous growth, going from about 
twenty thousand to more than fifty thousand people. The populations of both 
Mostar and Banja Luka increased from circa ten to fifteen thousand people.23 
Proportionately, Mostar’s Muslim population fell from 59.1% to 43.9%, but 
their absolute number increased from 6,421 to 7,212. The Orthodox population 
in Mostar remained stable at around 28% (with an increase of circa 1,500 peo-
ple), and the Catholic population experienced huge growth, from 1,366 (12.5%) 
to 4,307 people (26.7%).24 
In the Habsburg period, a new Mostar came to life west of the river, with new 
infrastructure as well as new buildings for public services and offices, for the 
army, for occasional workers and for guests.25 In comparison, the following 
period of royal Yugoslavia was a time of demographic decline and stagnation 
for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only new arrivals to Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
towns came from the nearby countryside, while the Muslim population, after 
suffering losses due to the arrival of Serb troops, underwent a progressive 
downfall in economic property and social status. Mostar had the smallest 
growth rate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Sarajevo also suffered under the eco-
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  Robin OKEY, Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg “Civilizing Mission” in Bosnia, 
1878-1914, Oxford 1997, 239. 
18
  Dalibor ČEPULO, Continuities and Discontinuities: The Constitutional and Political Develop-
ment of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 1990, in: Časopis za suvremenu povijest 36 (2004), no. 1, 
377. 
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  Kmets were not properly serfs but “costumary tenants”, and in 1910 most of them were Chris-
tian Orthodox (73.92%) or Catholics (21.49%), cf. Ivo BANAC, The National Question in 
Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca 1988, 367; and Mitja VELIKONJA, Religious 
Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, College Station 2003, 124. 
20
  OKEY, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 239; VELIKONJA, Religious Separation and Political In-
tolerance, 124. 
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  Dževad JUZBAŠIĆ, Nacionalno-politički odnosi u Bosanskohercegovačkom saboru i jezičko 
pitanje (1910-1914), Sarajevo 1999, 33-38. 
22
  Robert J. DONIA, Sarajevo: a Biography, Ann Arbor 2006, 64. 
23  Ibid., 64. 
24
  Ibid., 64; VELIKONJA, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance, 122. See also Dervo 
VAJZOVIĆ, Stanovništvo Mostara 1879.-1991., Mostar 2005. 
25
  VAJZOVIĆ, Stanovništvo Mostara, 160. 
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nomic and autocratic political centralism of the new state. In 1938, Sarajevo’s 
annual budget per inhabitant was approximately one third of what was spent per 
capita in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.26  
The First World War was a difficult time, with “severe privations” for Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and more than 300,000 dead, and further violence against 
Muslim landlords ensued in the war’s immediate aftermath.27 Nevertheless, 
World War One and the postwar violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina ought not to 
be compared with what was experienced by people elsewhere in the Balkans or 
east central Europe – like the Serb/Albanian or Ukranian/Polish border areas, 
for example. Nor should this period be compared to the Second World War and 
its aftermath in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. The country’s experience during the 
Second World War was dramatic and brutal; it was characterized by extermina-
tion policies against political and ethnic opponents, beginning with the anti-
communist, anti-Serb and anti-Jewish policies carried out by the Independent 
State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH). This violence initiated a 
three-sided civil war between Serb Monarchists, Croatian NDH troops and 
communist-led partisans, which further exacerbated interethnic relations and 
left many open wounds. Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged with an unpredicted Yu-
goslav political solution and moral recomposition. The new situation did not 
exclude a priori – on the grounds of ethnicity – any local individual or cultural 
group from joining the anti-fascist fight and participating politically in the new 
socialist society. Military and political opponents, however, whether from the 
war or the postwar period, were repressed with murderous violence. The affir-
mation of the socialist revolution after World War Two was prone with violence 
and authoritarianism, as strong anti-religious and centralist policies were put in 
place, and there was vast political repression following the Tito-Stalin split of 
1948. Still, the situation did slowly improve. In both world wars, political tran-
sitions and the subsequent affirmation of two different kinds of multiethnic na-
tional states – the first (royal) and the second (socialist) Yugoslavia – dimin-
ished the multiethnic character of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian towns. Despite 
the loss of several thousand non-Slavic Muslims, Germans and Jews, however, 
these towns remained multicultural. The socialist state in particular eventually 
integrated the different Slavic religious/national communities into its Yugoslav 
project.  
Even though Bosnia-Herzegovina had the lowest rate of economic growth in 
the Yugoslavia of the 1950s and 1960s, some towns did enjoy a certain degree 
of industrialization.28 In Mostar, metal-workingfactories, cotton textile mills and 
an aluminium plant became sources of new jobs and of new flows of immigra-
tion from other Yugoslav republics, particularly from Serbia and Croatia, and to 
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a lesser extent from Montenegro: by 1961, half of Mostar’s thirty-five thousand 
inhabitants had been born elsewhere.29 Interestingly enough, this period of eco-
nomic prosperity and development is often idealized because of its presumed 
demographic stability. In comparison to the present-day city, the demographic 
composition of which was deeply altered by the 1990s war, socialist Mostar is 
perceived as the good old days of the “born” Mostarians (rođeni mostarci), that 
is when the city was inhabited by “true” Mostarians (the so-called Mostarska 
raja).30 Many true Mostarians were interviewed for the previously mentioned 
ethnographic film Around Mostar, the Bridge and Bruce Lee.31 In their attempts 
to explain the town’s currently fragmented society, they cited the divisions cre-
ated by the war, but they also referred to the incomplete assimilation of the huge 
number of non Mostarians who settled in town during and after the 1990s con-
flict.32 According to the Mostarians who remember the prewar transnational 
socialization with nostalgia, the newcomers have enhanced the logic and reality 
of polarization, while the Yugoslav time is remembered as a period when social 
cohesion was high across all segments of the local population.  
This view may, in part, be a myth. Still, it is based on people’s memory of 
authentic, wide open transethnic interactions and socialization in Mostar be-
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  Mili Tiro, Manager of the Pavarotti Music Center and organizer of the Mostar Blues Festival, 
a particular proponent of this idea (Mostar, 2 December, 2009), and Amela Bećirović, founder 
of the Entrepreneurship and Business Association Link (Mostar, 1 April, 2009).  
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tween the 1960s and the 1980s. Moreover, this view is shared by many inhabit-
ants of Bosnian-Herzegovinian towns. It is also reflected statistically in the in-
crease of self-identified Yugoslavs in the censuses until 1981. This increase 
occurred despite the fact that beginning in 1971, citizens could declare them-
selves Muslims “in a national sense”. By 1981, more than 300,000 Bosnian-
Herzegovinians declared themselves Yugoslavs (7.8%).33 In the second half of 
the 1980s Wolfgang Höpken called the constantly increasing number of Yugo-
slavs a testament to “social change”. He noted this trend’s urban peculiarity and 
its presumable link to mixed marriages, since “in the cities social values change 
and religiously connotated national definitions tend to lose ground faster than in 
rural areas”.34 
In 1981, Yugoslavs comprised 22.4% of the 63,427 inhabitants of the city of 
Mostar.35 The 1991 census then indicated a decrease; at that time, 11,555 (or 
15.23%) of the 75,865 people in the city (grad), and 12,768 (or 10.08%) of the 
126,628 people in the whole municipality (općina) declared themselves Yugo-
slavs. These figures were higher than in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of the 
4,377,033 inhabitants of the Republic, 242,682 (or 5.54%) declared themselves 
Yugoslavs.36  
A strong, shared sense of distinction and uniqueness is considered a charac-
teristic aspect of Mostarian identity. This is especially true of the many inhabi-
tants who were raised in the former Yugoslavia. Others, among them also born 
Mostarians, see things differently and consider division to be a normal aspect of 
Mostar. These different attitudes towards the Mostar of the past and of the pre-
sent can also be found among external observers and scholars. Fragmentation 
and cohesion, integration and disunion are competing forces in the history of 
this city. Indeed, the picture and discourse of cohesion and tolerance associated 
with the socialist period and applied particularly vigorously to Mostar, but also 
to Sarajevo and even to Bosnia-Herzegovina more generally, had both advo-
cates and sceptics inside and outside the country. According to the sceptics, 
tolerance, hate, coexistence and fear could all be used to describe Bosnian soci-
ety, in the present and past times, in urban and rural settings.37  
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Ethnic segmentation along religious lines is a historical peculiarity of Bos-
nian society. It is also an often celebrated characteristic of Ottoman rule, which 
is considered to have been simultaneously tolerant and repressive. In fact, the 
politicization of ethnic differences began during the Ottoman period, in con-
comitance with the establishment of a local Muslim-oriented press, along with 
the Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox presses, which were both strongly influ-
enced by Croat and Serb cultural and political movements outside Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This segmentation was then expressed in the separate national 
movements of Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Each of these groups had separate 
political goals and tendencies while the region was under Habsburg rule at the 
end of the 19th century.38  
Along with the dynamics of party politics in the late Habsburg and early 
Yugoslav times, divisions along national and religious lines were accepted and 
supported by a consistent and influential portion of the population. “Confes-
sional loyalty” remained the main reason for Bosnian Muslims supporting Mus-
lim parties in the 1910 and post-World War One elections.39 The elected Mus-
lim delegates, especially those in the new south Slavic state, tended to identify 
nationally with either the Serbs or the Croats.40 This was not the sign of a weak 
propensity towards a separate political identity. Instead, it exemplifies Muslims’ 
ability to negotiate identity according to their agenda and the available dis-
courses and political resources of the time. Muslim intellectuals were able to 
participate politically and nationally identify with Croats or Serbs. They could 
also insist on their Muslim peculiarity. Some of them went through more than 
one national conversion.41 Accordingly, the Muslim delegates accepted and 
promoted variable alliances and coalitions, in both the late Habsburg diet and 
the Yugoslav Skupština. 
Yugoslavism started to play a role, especially among the younger genera-
tions, before and after World War One, and Social Democrats – who were to 
become communists in the new state – started to gather workers’ support. In 
both respects Bosnian-Herzegovinian voters expressed their preference for par-
ties with which they could easily identify on national or religious grounds. Not 
even one social democrat was elected to the provincial Diet in 1910, due to the 
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limited franchise of the voting system.42 The electorate’s will to reward parties 
according to their political-religious identity was equally important, however. 
Four parties served in the Diet: one Muslim, one Serb, and two Croatian. Of the 
two Croatian parties, one emphasized its secular and supra-confessional orienta-
tion, while the other promoted a strong Catholic-centered program.43 This re-
sulted in different kinds of alliances among the four parties. 
In the first Yugoslavia, more parties stood for election, and more potential 
political alliances emerged. Muslims still moved between the national identity 
options existing at the time (Croat and Serb). The idea of the nation was still 
perceived as a secular concept far from Islamic logic. Nevertheless, the process 
of national identification was clearly related to denominational differences. As 
such, it was also at stake for the Muslim population. Ethnic/religious identity 
was clearly orienting people’s votes and the stances of political leaders. The 
same process took place at the end of the 20th century, as part of the shift to po-
litical pluralism and the first free elections. This was remarkable because all the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian components had successfully integrated into the Yugo-
slav state, and pre-election surveys showed a strong endorsement for Yugosla-
via and a transnational, transreligious Bosnia-Herzegovina. These same surveys 
also found solid support for the transnational options offered by parties like 
Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković’s Union of Yugoslav Reform Forces and 
the League of Communists. Nevertheless, the 1990 Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
elections were won by nationally oriented parties, which together garnered 84% 
of the votes.44 
The national radicalization of electoral choices was clearly rooted in the pe-
riod before the Yugoslav crisis. The timing of the elections, according to Burg 
and Shoup, “contributed to increasing the dominance of ethnic identities in de-
fining the pattern of voting, and to pushing the three nationalist parties toward 
conflict”.45 They add that the victory of the nationalist parties was “based on 
fear rather than on popular support for the views of the nationalists them-
selves”.46 Ethnoreligious orientation as an electoral choice cohered with what 
was going on in the rest of Yugoslavia and reflected people’s preoccupations, 
and, therefore, the propensity to seek shelter with imagined siblings. This 
choice drew on the traditional cultural attitudes of the population in a time of 
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crisis, in a situation where many established truths were being shaken. At the 
same time, it was a political choice, and one very much connected with the po-
litical juncture. It did not come from ethnic imperatives, since many people’s 
preferences could have switched to more viable political options in favor of 
Yugoslav and/or integral Bosnian-Herzegovinian options. At the time, the Serb 
side was still internally politically fragmented.47 The leaders and founders of the 
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, HDZ BiH) and the Bosniak Party of Democ-
ratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) were people of diverse atti-
tudes. Their ranks included nationalists as well as moderates open to dialogue 
and to alternatives. In 1990, the President of the HDZ BiH was the former 
communist dissident and moderate Stjepan Kljuić. He had received the most 
votes from Croats in that year’s election and had fought for the integrity of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is why he was dismissed at the beginning of 1992.48 
Among the founders of the SDA were pro-Yugoslavists like the former com-
munist dissident Adil Zulfikarpašić, who founded a more liberal and secularly 
oriented Muslim Bosniak Organization (Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija) 
right before the elections, and the renowned former communist and business-
man Fikret Abdić. The latter got more votes than the SDA President Alija 
Izetbegović in 1990, but failed to represent the party at the Bosnian Presidency.  
Multiethnic societies carry various degrees of “conflict potential”. As re-
cently suggested by the political analyst Bojana Blagojević, however, “ethnic 
conflict occurs when a particular set of factors and conditions converge”.49 
Among these factors, which other authors have also deployed in order to ex-
plain the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s, are “a major structural crisis; presence of 
historical memories of interethnic grievances; institutional factors that promote 
ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical memories by political entrepre-
neurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment, and hate toward the 
‘other’”.50 This and other similar interpretations of the Bosnian conflict explain 
the propensity of being involved and mobilized in ethnic conflict, but miss one 
basic factor: in Bosnia-Herzegovina, war knocked at most people’s door before 
they made any ethnic choice. Electoral segmentation and polarization was defi-
nitely a sign that people were anchored to their ethnic identity. As in World War 
Two, however, when villages were attacked by Ustaša and Četnik formations, 
the situation changed dramatically in 1992 when the war from Croatia pene-
trated into Bosnia-Herzegovina. People needed protection and resources. It is 
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not my intention to enter such a huge debate, and doing so is certainly beyond 
the scope of this article, but both in 1941 and in 1992 most people suddenly 
found themselves in a widespread ethnic conflict before they had chosen to mo-
bilize. The way people then did mobilize and choose sides reflected, in turn, the 
ongoing polarization and the efficacy of nationalist political entrepreneurs who 
spread “ethnic intolerance, fear, resentment, and hate”. Influential political 
leaders fuelled the conflict, in Croatia first and subsequently in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, eliminating both individuals who had stood up against the war 
and possibilities for a political solution or compromise. 
The elements of a shared identity would not spare Mostar from the politiciza-
tion and polarization of ethnic/religious identities during the war and the subse-
quent period of transition. A higher degree of political and social segmentation 
would have occurred in any case, though many attitudes of intercultural rela-
tionships and feelings of sharing a common city would also have played a role 
in the game of politicization and socialization. Nevertheless, elements of shared 
identity certainly did not and could not spare Mostar from the war or the conse-
quent thick spatial division. Mostar featured some elements of ethnonational 
contention before the war, too. In a situation of high political crisis where ethnic 
differences were being politicized, these elements would turn against the city’s 
pluralism, but not necessarily lead to violent conflict. Had war never occurred, 
the spatial division would not have taken place.  
Socialist Yugoslav times were not only a period of low intensity ethnona-
tional consciousness, but also a time of propensity towards Yugoslav identifica-
tion and of interethnic relationships and socialization. In the urban spaces, so-
cialist Yugoslav housing policies also reduced the traditional linkages of old 
inhabitants with their urban ethnic niches, thinning the possibility of territorially 
based specific identities and of related political claims. Urban planners and ad-
ministrators were moved more by other ideological drives and by practical pre-
occupations than by the imperative to build ethnically segregated areas in the 
constantly growing urban areas. In the 1990s, the combination of democratic 
pluralism, ethnonational strains, and the commencement and spread of war rep-
resented intertwining drives that influenced the political and identity orienta-
tions of the people as well as the policies and practices of leaders and adminis-
trators. A certain degree of division within Mostar’s society and the develop-
ment of political and cultural polarization along religious/ethnic lines has been 
under way from the very beginning of multiparty democracy. The 1990s war in 
Mostar, therefore, was not the source of the ethnopolitical competition. Rather it 
caused the physical division and the unmixing of peoples.  
In the areas on the west side of Mostar that were controlled by the Croatian 
Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO), armed men asked apartment 
dwellers “Šta si?” (“What are you?”). In one case, a woman named Amina was 
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asked precisely “Šta si?” “Šta je tvoj otac?” (“What are you?” “What is your 
father?”) by soldiers who were apparently from outside of town (supposedly 
from Dalmatia).51 “My father works at Aluminium”, she answered. “No!”, 
yelled the soldier with impatience and a machine gun in his hands: “I asked 
what are you?! Are you ours (naš)?? ... Are you Croat or Muslim?!”. Visits like 
this one occurred in many apartments in west Mostar. Along with shootings and 
shelling targeting Amina’s and other houses supposedly inhabited by Bosniaks, 
these visits convinced her and many others to move to the older, eastern part of 
town. While expulsions were carried out, thousands of Bosniak soldiers and 
civilians were captured and imprisoned in concentration camps such as the in-
famous Heliodrom.52 
The Bulevar, which runs across the town one hundred meters west of the 
river Neretva, became the front line between east and west Mostar and the cen-
tre of constant artillery fire from both sides. The 1994 Washington Agreement, 
which was signed by the political rulers of the internationally recognized Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Republic of Croatia – acting on 
behalf of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna –, resulted in a ceasefire be-
tween the Croatian and Bosniak forces. It did not end, however, the tensions, 
especially in the mixed cantons of the Croatian-Bosniak joint Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mostar remained completely divided until the end of 
the 1990s, with two administrations, two infrastructures and a bipolar ethnic 
structure. The Serbs had left town during the first phase of the local war, and 
few have returned since the end of the 1990s. At the time of the 1991 census, 
Serbs accounted for around 18-19% of the population, both in the overall mu-
nicipality and within Mostar’s inner city (grad).53 In the following decade, 
Serbs and Yugoslavs were replaced by ethnic Croats and Bosniaks, who had 
already been the two largest communities in prewar Mostar. There were now 
0.3% more Muslims in the municipality and a greater number of Muslims in the 
immediate urban space (grad): 34.1% vs. 28.7%.54  
The wartime and postwar departures, as well as the contemporaneous arrivals 
from the countryside, deeply modified the demographic composition of the 
town and substantially transformed its social and cultural structure. According 
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to United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) statistics, the municipality of 
Mostar had lost around one sixth of its population. At the beginning of the new 
millennium, it had only 105,408 permanent residents. Of these, about 50,000 (or 
47%) were thought to be Bosniaks and 51,000 (or 48%) Croats.55 Inquiries 
about the number of registered voters, conducted by the local parties and by the 
International Crisis Group in 2003, estimated Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs to be 
58%, 40% and 1.5% respectively, while a newer analysis conducted in 2008 
suggested figures of 53%, 44% and 3% respectively.56 
All in all, the approximately 40,000 residents who fled the town during the 
war were replaced by about the same number of refugees. There were around 
30,000 refugees in the eastern part of town and approximately 10,000 in the 
western part of the town by the end of the 1990s.57 In the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian war, “ninety percent of the prewar Bosnian-Serb population left 
the area now called the Federation, and over ninety-five percent of prewar Bos-
nian-Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian-Muslim) inhabitants left what is now Repub-
lika Srpska”.58 The cultural composition of all the towns involved in the wars 
was deeply altered. Substantial demographic changes have been legitimized and 
enhanced by the postwar peace process, and very limited, partial results have 
been obtained by the internationally sponsored returnee programs. What appears 
to be irredeemably lost is the social cohesion and mutual trust among the differ-
ent groups across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the transition from so-
cialism to a new political configuration, the contention over Mostar by political 
parties structured along ethno(-religious) national lines was probably unavoid-
able. Spatial division and segregation, however, were a direct result of the war. 
The Croatian-Bosniak war and the 1990s postwar, despite international inter-
vention, produced a stiff demarcation line and a political, economic and admin-
istrative division between two ethnically and religiously reinforced national 
communities. Freedom of movement has been restored, and some people have 
returned to their prewar apartments. Yet, the thick division between Bosniak-
dominated east Mostar and Croat-dominated west Mostar did not vanish. On the 
contrary, the postwar period enhanced the partition, extending it further into the 
realm of social interactions. Meanwhile, the media, the reconstruction of urban 
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infrastructure and the policy of religious, cultural and political institutions 
stimulated polarization and national homogeneity on both sides. Public space in 
Mostar became a symbolic battlefield. It was a continuation of the war by other 
means. 
Mostar is not the only well-known town that remains disputed along the fault 
lines of wartime divisions. Mitrovica, in Kosovo, is another paradigmatic ex-
ample of what is perceived as unfinished business. It features a contested border 
between two well defined urban areas divided by the river Ibar. War was also a 
crucial element in the physical division of Mitrovica, though interethnic ten-
sions and clashes commenced in Kosovo before they did in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. War is not the only cause of such situations of instability, but it is 
often a point of no return. Issues of interethnic contention among culturally dif-
ferentiated groups may explain or even cause, the beginning of violence. Such 
violence does not always develop into uncontrolled clashes or lead to war, how-
ever. Partition has been used to control situations of ethnic conflict. Although, it 
has been noted, partition has very often worsened the situation. Thus, “in Cy-
prus, India, Palestine and Ireland rather than separating irreconcilable ethnic 
groups”, partitioning cities and regions “had fomented more violence and forced 
mass migration”.59 Partition is not always feasible, and although it might seem 
to be a solution to violence, it does not necessarily bring peace. On the contrary, 
it can lead to higher levels of conflict.60 
Presently, statehood issues and interethnic nationalist contention are causing 
instability and division in other towns of the former Yugoslavia. In southern 
Serbia and Macedonia, for example, partition does not presently seem to be a 
viable solution. In Skopje, ethnonational tensions have the potential to erupt 
into a state of uncontrollable violence. Any serious political crisis that combines 
the city’s endemic socio-economic instability with the concerns of its sizeable 
Albanian minority, still searching for more political recognition and autono-
mous space, could trigger violence. Skopje’s huge new monuments to Alexan-
der the Great, along with its statue of the Slavic Macedonian king Samuel of 
Bulgaria, and its statue of Skanderbeg in the Albanian district, make the city a 
paradigmatic example of new national mythopoeic projects that have trans-
formed the cityscape and its political balance. These statues and the ongoing 
competition over the symbolic core of the new nation in public space imply a 
problem of sovereignty in the new Macedonian state, a state that is still incapa-
ble of resolving the dispute over its official name in the international arena. 
In the former Yugoslavia in particular, and throughout central-eastern Europe 
more generally, the dismissal of the old socialist presence has left an ideological 
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vacuum and thus created an empty space for new nation building projects and 
policies. These have been led by the new states and by organized groups seek-
ing political and symbolic recognition in their territories. A source of instability 
lies in the combination of the pressures and requests for legitimisation by organ-
ized ethnic minorities and the actions and reactions of states eager to reestablish 
and reinforce the ideological basis of their authority with new radical policies of 
nation building. This is very definitely the case in Skopje, but also in Mostar. 
Both are contested and mixed cities in which confrontation for and in public 
space is a particularly visible and noticeable embodiment of political competi-
tion. This confrontation takes place among culturally polarized groups and 
among their elected representatives or self-appointed leaders. The state also 
takes part in the use and symbolic occupation of urban spaces in everyday po-
litical confrontation.  
In ethnonationally mixed and disputed towns, urban public space is an arena 
in which different ethnic or national groups legitimate themselves, socialize, 
and organize divergent political discourses. In these cities, which reveal them-
selves as both divided and contested, rival groups engage in a competition for 
public space, “bound up with sovereignty disputes” that supersede the problem-
atic issues of a pluralist and multicultural society.61 Globalization and economic 
transition may be relevant variables but not crucial aspects of this category of 
divided cities, which are most significantly embedded in ethnonational conflicts 
over statehood and sometimes marked with violence. In some of these towns, 
intercommunal rivalry embedded in wider conflicts over state sovereignty have 
produced or “seemed inevitably to recommend” a partition.62 Jerusalem and 
Nicosia are striking examples of this situation. State borders may run along par-
tition lines, but sometimes physical barriers segregate different parts and inhabi-
tants of a city that lies at the border of two states or of two quasi-states in con-
struction. Such was the position of Mostar during the Croatian-Bosniak war; it 
was controlled by competing forces that intended to establish different states in 
the same area. These were the HVO, which was fighting for the state of Herceg-
Bosna, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Herce-
govine, ArBiH), which was fighting for an integral Bosnia Herzegovina.  
In Nicosia and throughout the rest of Cyprus, a fence along the rigid Green 
Line separates two different territorial and political entities, one of which is a 
state not recognized by the international community. The Turkish-Greek separa-
tion line was first marked in the capital approximately fifteen years before the 
1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the formal establishment of the present 
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division.63 In Nicosia, the Green Line was meant to keep the contending sides 
apart. The only place where Turks and Greeks continued to live side by side 
was the tiny village of Pyla/Pile.64 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the city of Sarajevo 
has seen similar divisions. The district of Istočno Sarajevo (East Sarajevo), 
which belonged to the city before the wars of the 1990s, is no longer part of it. 
Instead, it is now part of the other entity that comprises the same country, the 
Republika Srpska. In this latter case there is no longer a physical barrier, but the 
administrative border between the two areas of the prewar city, and also be-
tween the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, coincides with an ethnonational 
differentiation produced by the war and reinforced in the postwar, despite the 
return of formerly displaced people.  
In Mostar, non-physical barriers still divide the town. The wartime front line, 
however, disappeared after the war when the town was integrated into the Croa-
tian-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the formal unification 
of the local administration in 2004, most public services are still administered 
separately in practice and Mostar remains a dual city. The only unitary munici-
pal service that functions over the entire urban area is the fire department. There 
is a unified public transport system, but only one bus line goes around the whole 
town. People tend to remain in their own side of town, although shopping trips 
sometimes cause people to venture out. Very recently, the public park at the 
eastern edge of the Croat side of town has been restored by the municipality. It 
is unclear how many people from east Mostar take their small children there, 
however. Some open concerts on the main square of the old front line bring 
people to the same place at the same time. Nevertheless, almost twenty years 
after the end of the war, nearly a decade after the formal unification of the city 
administration, and despite the establishment of freedom of movement, few 
exchanges take place across the former front line, especially among the younger 
generations.65 
The old Mostarians’ (“Mostarska raja”) dismay about this new situation is 
strong. They perceive of themselves as a hopeless minority in the city’s new 
demographic and cultural panorama. Many regret the division and despise it as 
artificial, even though they are conscious of its strength. On the other hand, 
there are other pravi Mostarci who see the partition as an unconvertible reality 
or even a necessity for reestablishing “normal” conditions. The problem of Mo-
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star is the “unsolved national question”, says the Mostar writer Veselin Gatalo, 
who was interviewed for our film.  
“Unfinished business” is the title of a well-known BBC documentary on the 
war in Mostar, which might well be applied to the situation of the whole coun-
try, whose destiny remains unclear. Partition along national lines seems a likely 
outcome. Reestablishing a formal border and two autonomous communities is 
the suggestion of some Mostarians who are primarily interested in living in a 
“normal” town. A town is not normal, many of these people pointed out to me, 
when it is incapable of electing a mayor. In Mostar, this inability has been due 
to the incapacity or irresponsibility of the local political parties as well as the 
rules imposed by the Dayton Agreement and the international community. After 
the October 2008 elections, it took more than four hundred days before the 
council representatives finally managed to elect a mayor. Even then, the elec-
tion only happened due to the intervention of the High Representative in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina.  
In contested cities like Mostar, which are characterized by non-consensual 
citizenship, and where ethnonationalist confrontations diminish “the legitimacy 
of the state itself”66, the “logic of identity politics” has begun to characterize 
and dominate political competition.67 In such situations sectarian political entre-
preneurs have found legitimisation and resources from above and supporters 
and legitimisation from below by triggering a political confrontation, based on 
cultural differences and influencing everyday life and socialization. It is within 
this framework that we can compare the local competition, the ethnonational 
mobilization and the urban display of ethnonational symbols in contemporary 
towns like Mostar to those deployed in other contested frameworks, like 19th 
century Bohemia.68 
Even in contested cities, there are patterns of communication, interaction and 
cooperation across ethnonational boundaries. Bohemian Czechs and Germans 
did more than just fight each other during the 19th century, although the con-
flicts between them are remembered best because they were singled out by coe-
val media and narrated in history books. Even in nineteenth and 20th century 
Nicosia (at least until the upheaval of the late 1960s), interactions took place 
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between neighbors, in trading circumstances, and in some political frames. 
These interactions occurred despite the low degree of secularization and the 
language barrier. In Mostar and in the other towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
cross-religious interactions had long been regular occurrences, regardless of the 
traditional segmentation of society. Both the general process of secularization 
and the first and second Yugoslav state ideologies fostered cross-cultural com-
munications and relations in the 20th century, despite moments of crisis. After 
the new shock of the nineties war, physical contacts and interactions began to 
grow once again. Both cooperative and hostile forms of interaction occur in the 
virtual world (internet sites, blogs, social networks… even between radio audi-
ences), but also on the ground. In the physical world, these interactions take 
place within occasional or recurring circumstances, especially in leisure and 
music related situations. During the research for our ethnographic film, we en-
countered many examples of transnational communication and interaction tak-
ing place in blogs, internet sites and social networks, but also in cafés, shops 
and markets, and in theatres and concert venues. Physical interactions are more 
likely to subsist when intercommunal violence does not prevail and freedom of 
movement is realized. The spatial organization of the divided Mostar, however, 
with its very limited interface area, prevents both conflict and cooperation. 
In 2005, a local association erected a monument to Bruce Lee as a provoca-
tive protest against the pervasive logic of segregation and the appropriation of 
urban public space. Some young Mostarians welcomed the statue as a positive 
step beyond the prevailing politics and constant attitude of ethnonational de-
marcation of urban space. Hundreds of them gathered in the rain to see the un-
veiling of the first non-ethnic monument in post-Yugoslav Mostar. The men-
tioned poet and writer Veselin Gatalo69 was one of the main promoters of the 
monument. In our film he says: 
“We were looking for a hero that can be ours.  
A hero from our childhood,  
from the time when we believed that justice and respect  
could fight against the violence of money and power.  
And here Bruce Lee remains one of our biggest models.  
We all loved him: Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks … 
He was “ours”!  
We practiced karate which he performed.  
Besides that, Bruce Lee is a hero who is far enough from us  
Nobody will ask him what his parents did in the Second World War … 
Where was he ... 
… or about his roots.” 
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Some people attacked the statue the very night it was inaugurated, and further 
attacks (likely some kung-fu move) pushed the Chinese-American global film 
star off his bronze pedestal. The “dragon”, who was venerated by many Yugo-
slav kids in Mostar during the 1970s and 1980s, was forced to seek a safer shel-
ter, from which he is still awaiting to be reinstalled.  
I was in Mostar for the inauguration of the Bruce Lee monument and had the 
impression that more of the young people who came to this event were from 
west Mostar than from the east. Talking with people those days, I also had the 
impression that Croat kids and even older people from the Croatian side were 
more enthusiastic about the statue than those from east Mostar. At the time I 
interpreted this as a stronger desire for change on the part of west Mostarians, 
and the difficulty of east Mostarians to escape from a sort of victim’s box. The 
destroyed Old Bridge is also a metaphor of something broken, and the east Mo-
starians are still awaiting compensation for and recognition of what the Croats 
did. Young west Mostarians, however, do not feel that they are personally 
guilty even when they recognize the Croatian HVO’s responsibility for destroy-
ing the bridge. Above all, they want to move on. 
But this is only one side of the story. When I asked some young Mostarians 
in the east about the Bruce Lee statue in 2009, they told me: “They should have 
put the Bruce Lee monument under the bridge! There, it would have been safe!” 
They probably felt that the statue would have been protected in the same way as 
the New Old Bridge, which is now guarded by the Ikari (or Mostari), the 
“jumpers from the bridge”. The jumpers’ association has its headquarters right 
on the place where the Ottoman soldiers who guarded and protected the bridge 
were once stationed. It also happens to be the spot where the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian army fought during the 1990s. Throughout history the Old 
Bridge has experienced various shifts in meaning. Recently, it has been re-
islamicized.70 Bruce Lee, a Chinese Californian actor and martial arts master, 
became a global star and a hero fighting for justice in the 1970s Yugoslav kids’ 
imaginary. At the same time, he was a symbol of a wishfully de-ethnicized Mo-
star, whose monument was conceived in a west Mostar café but might eventu-
ally end up in the east, under the bridge! The bridge itself is a symbolic battle-
field. In July 2004, on the night of its inauguration, one could hear these words: 
“The bridge had its spiritual meaning in connecting two shores, including eve-
rything that this has always meant. And this is binding people and their cultures 
and differences […].”  
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These words were solemnly pronounced by the speaker during the interna-
tionally broadcast opening of the New Old Bridge, which fit perfectly well with 
the intermingling of international symbolic expectations and the local attempts 
to fulfil them. The bridge does not fill the gap, of course, since it does not sym-
bolically or materially bond Croats and Bosniaks, or the two sides of the dis-
connected city. The bridge is inside east Mostar, as it was east of the front line. 
In the future it might once again become a shared symbol of the town. For the 
time being, tourism works. The bridge, after all, is beautiful like the new old 
town. Says Gatalo, on the Bridge:  
 “When I think of Mostar, and I am away,  
the Bridge is the first thing that comes to my mind. 
But it is a constant; there is nothing there that divides us,  
Nothing that binds us. And that’s it. 
Something that we love. 
And now, all these silly things  
Of which some people abroad live when they say: 
“Some people love the Bridge, some people don’t.” 
This is absurd. 
We all love it, 
Whether we accept it or not 
And precisely this “those who love it – those who love it not” 
Causes the fight. 
The Bridge is here and, we love it and that’s it. 
Because the Bridge was destroyed by four, maybe five people, 
But “some people love the Bridge, some people don’t” - 
Ridiculous.” 
The bridge was severely damaged by constant shelling from HVO tanks, which 
probably caused its eventual collapse. HVO General Slobodan Praljak has de-
nied allegations that he ordered the bridge’s final destruction. Recently, Croat 
allegations that Muslims caused the final fall of the bridge for political pur-
poses, have appeared in the press and in blogs. These allegations have caused 
endless quarrels.71 Such quarrels also reflect the prevailing antagonism, as it is 
often expressed violently between young Mostarians during internationally 
broadcast soccer matches or on occasions of local derby matches between Bos-
niak and Croat teams. The latter have primarily concerned matches between the 
former common city club Velež and the Croat team Zrinjski, which was banned 
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in 1945 but reestablished in 1992.72 Sometimes these football supporters engage 
in violent confrontations along the war’s front line. However, we should not 
mix the responsibility for war with the fights and screams occurring around the 
soccer stadium between the supporters of Zrinjski and Velež. These are, one 
could say, normal aspects of a modern European town. Indeed, we should not 
mix the memory of a war fought by soldiers twenty years ago with the street 
fights of their sons or younger brothers. These youth tend to identify with the 
older soldiers whose political importance in perpetuating Mostar’s division is 
very often overestimated by the press. In our film, Veselin Gatalo, utters a 
warning: 
“Nothing comes spontaneously. 
All these things came from above.  
It means that to someone it suits. 
Try to buy “mortadella” in Sarajevo. 
That would be a difficult endeavor. 
Although people ate it before the war in Sarajevo, 
And if they get the chance they eat it now. 
But you cannot buy it. Maybe in some places […]. 
In east Mostar I don’t think you can buy it. 
But this thing is originated from […] above. 
Some people keep this situation, 
They have helpers abroad who sell certain theories  
And live of it. 
Because a lot of people would lose their job, 
A lot of people would lose their positions  
If the town started to live normally. 
Because in two post offices work 150 people, 
And in one would work 75. 
The Mayor controls one side, 
The Vice mayor the other.” 
Since the new city law was passed in 2004, the posts of mayor and vice-mayor 
(reserved for a Croat and a Bosniak or vice versa) have been unified. Public 
services and job resources, however, have continued to operate on two tracks. 
The border is still there, even though it has been erased from maps. Its existence 
is determined by new daily habits, and it is deployed for political-economic 
purposes. Some families live on the other side of the tracks, but very few people 
live in the border area. For some time after the war, the immediate vicinity of 
the old front line was organized as a Central District with central buildings and 
public offices that could easily be reached from both sides of the city. Here, 
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along the old front line, there is also a bottom-up reaction to segregationism. It 
is expressed in a desire to expand a sort of shared space used by everyone. Right 
after the Bulevar, one of the most damaged front line roads is Šantićeva street. It 
was named long ago after the poet Aleksa Šantić, a local Serb. This street is part 
of the former Central District. Nearby are the offices of the Norwegian NGO 
Nansen Dialogue Center. The youth cultural association Abrašević has been 
active all these years promoting a local third space and an alternative to the 
segregation of socialization. On the same street there is a local radio that refuses 
to be nationally identified (Radio Studio 88). Some small enterprises (like the 
Entrepreneurship and Business Association Link as well as other micro-finance 
institutions) have chosen to settle in proximity of the Bulevar. The nearby Span-
ish Square (Španjski trg in Bosnian language and Španjolski trg in Croatian 
language), is at the centre of the old front line. It was originally meant to be the 
site of the Bruce Lee monument. The statue eventually ended up in the city 
park, very close to the old front line, but on the Croatian side of the city. A few 
months before the statue was unveiled, Nino Raspudić, the monument’s other 
main promoter, said (in our film): 
“The statue will be placed in the city park, in the central city park. 
And will be in a place from which he will see, in fact, the whole park. 
He will look after the park 
And the kids playing there 
And the elders walking around, 
Couples who kiss each other on the benches 
[…]. 
The statue will be oriented towards the north  
Because in Mostar the public space is hyper-politicized  
And everything is divided and treated in a political manner. 
We could not orient him towards the east, or towards the west 
Because if I had turned him towards the west people would say that I made a 
Muslim Bruce Lee against Croats. 
Had I had turned him towards the east people would say that he is a Croat 
Bruce Lee attacking Muslims. 
We decided to turn him towards the north: towards Sarajevo, Zagreb, Bel-
grade, Bruxelles, Washington … .” 
Both Raspudić and Gatalo reserve an attitude of particular irony and detachment 
for the international observers. As mentioned, Gatalo has even written a book 
called SFOR (Siesta, Fiesta, Orgasmo, Riposo, otherwise the acronym for the 
International Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Sarajevo, Zagreb and 
Belgrade are all perceived as outside players, intruding into the local game. 
There is not much respect for local politicians either. Raspudić accuses them of 
having transformed the city into a urinal, a public toilet to mark their highly 
symbolic, segregationist policies. It is not a surprise that right on the Spanish 
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square, at the centre of the old front line, both Croat and Bosniak nationalists 
wished to build “their” objects, a national theatre and a religious/cultural centre.  
Nothing has been built on the Spanish square. Instead, two old Austrian 
buildings have been beautifully restored. One is the old city Gymnasium with 
separate Croatian and Bosnian curricula and now also hosting the United World 
College. Adjacent to it, on the Bulevar, is the new town hall. The latter was in-
augurated in 2012 but has never been used. A monument to HVO soldiers 
placed in front of the town hall provoked a boycott from the Bosniak parties. 
After some months, a monument to the opponent Armija Republike Bosne i 
Hercegovine appeared overnight and provoked strong reactions from local 
Croat parties. The former monument, Croat politicians said, had been placed 
instead of a cross long contested by Bosniak politicians. This conciliatory ges-
ture did not calm the Bosniaks down, au contraire. The monument to the Bos-
nian-Herzegovinian army was placed by unknowns, and other unknown people 
later blew it up. Presently the broken monument is still there. It has not been 
restored, and it has not been removed. 
Even if no physical barrier divides east Mostar from west Mostar, it is hard to 
find a coffee bar offering both local newspapers (the Sarajevo Dnevni Avaz and 
the west Mostar Dnevni List). The former front line lives on in people’s minds 
and influences political interactions and socialization. It belongs to neither of 
the contending sides, and contrary to Belfast’s interface areas, it is not densely 
populated. Nevertheless, as in Belfast, this is the area where violence is most 
likely to erupt. 
Without the war Mostar would not have become so radically divided. At the 
same time, plurality and segmentation, and the propensities towards both coop-
eration and conflict, are all elements of the city’s multicultural historical charac-
ter. According to old inhabitants of Mostar, the difference between prewar and 
postwar Mostar is so strong that it sometimes seems as if they are telling two 
different stories about two different towns. This is not particularly surprising for 
anybody with even limited knowledge of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Historical cir-
cumstances and conjunctures have produced different developments in the deli-
cate equilibrium between coexistence and conflict. The crisis of late 20th century 
Mostar is rooted in the Bosnian and Yugoslav crises, but it can also be observed 
through the lens of the history of multiethnic towns in modern Europe. 
The national homogenization processes in the transition to late 19th and 20th 
century national states have weakened the heterogeneous character of many 
central and eastern European towns. Yet, there is a strong difference between 
formerly divided and contested towns like L’vov, Wroclaw, and Thessaloniki – 
to name just a few – and Mostar, Banja Luka or Sarajevo. Unlike the former 
Yugoslav towns the first group of towns were radically changed by the 20th cen-
tury unmixing of peoples, which lagerly erased the peculiar plurilingual and 
plurireligious central and eastern European urban kaleidoscopes. Ethnic “clean-
sing” policies were pursued in Bosnia-Herzegovina during two different Euro-
pean moments of crisis; first during World War Two and then at the end of the 
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Cold War. A Croat and a Serb homogeneous nation state was the idealized 
model of political and cultural stability in both situations. The Muslims, how-
ever, were not perceived as a distinct nation in the 1940s as they were in the 
1990s. After World War Two, the socialist internationalist South Slav model 
offered a possibility for interethnic recomposition. Yet, it did so on the basis of 
a social and political revolution established with extreme violence, in the con-
text of an extremely violent civil war and an internationally tense postwar situa-
tion. The result was a new prospect for integration in a repressive and authori-
tarian framework of limited freedom. Nonetheless this new project enjoyed a 
great deal of support from the population, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where a new mixing of peoples was under way. Towards the end of the 20th cen-
tury, during the crisis of Yugoslav succession, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
military and political elites followed the nation state model. They fought against 
each other but also against multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only ideologi-
cal resource at stake for the Bosniak political elites.  
The latter, however, also supported a system that legitimized and deployed 
ethnic cleavages in the production of political discourses enhancing segmenta-
tion and cultural segregation. Moreover, these elites had a centralist stance to-
wards the overall state, the Federation and Sarajevo. At the same time, where 
Muslims were not a clear majority, as they were in the state as a whole and also 
in places like Mostar, they welcomed the consociational forms of democracy 
introduced by the international community. As Azra Hromadzić has pointed 
out, consociational democracy strengthened ethnic boundaries and favored the 
ethnicization of citizenship, because it offered political groups opportunities to 
organize their power in their specific part of the city through institutions and 
local governmental bodies.73  
Hromadzić also stressed the importance of territory in the process of the crea-
tion and development of ethnic citizenship in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The wartime 
and postwar political competition gave new meanings and new strength to the 
old and legitimized ethnonational differences. Division need not be understood 
in merely physical terms. Nicosia after the Turkish invasion of 1974 is the most 
notable example of such division. Nicosia first became physically divided soon 
after the independence of Cyprus in 1960. Then, a process of segregation devel-
oped alongside the enhancement of a line of division conceived as a means of 
limiting violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The origin of the vio-
lence was the mix of contestation and competition in the political and public 
sphere. The border that divides Nicosia into two clearly separate and segregated 
areas, like the one that divided Mostar during the war and in the immediate 
postwar period, is not the only element of division experienced by these and 
other divided urban populations. Segregation is frequently expressed in residen-
tial patterns, but also in various forms of social, political and cultural differen-
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tiation. These are crucial elements that characterize the division and contesta-
tion of Nicosia, Mostar, Belfast, and Jerusalem. Physical division, therefore, 
may not always be evident or visible. Contention in and for the public and po-
litical space originates division. In crises of statehood, violence makes tempo-
rary divisions more permanent. Partition may halt violence, but it also cements 
the violence-evoked status quo and thus impedes reconciliation and the recom-
position of a common political framework and a shared public space. 
